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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

Public Rights in Water: Recent Developments

B.

Research Sources

1.

General authorities on water law containing
thorough selections on public rights.
a.

J. Sax and R. Abrams, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES 30-153 (1986), casebook on water
law; chapter one devoted solely to recreational use and public rights in water.

b.

C. Meyers, D. Tarlock, J. Corbridge & D.
Getches, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(forthco;ming 1987), casebook on water law
with full coverage of public rights in water.

c.

F. Trelease and G. Gould, WATER LAW 23-70;
121-180 (4th ed. 1986), casebook on water
law.

d.

W. Hutchins, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1971-1977) (three volumes), treatise on
western water law, now somewhat dated.

e.

D. Getches, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1984),
overview of water law.

2.

Specific authorities on public rights in water
law.
a.

H. Althaus, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 1-70 (U.S.

Dept. of Interior, Nov. 3 1978), an expansive
treatment of the history of public rights in
water.
b.

Western States Water Council, INSTREAM FLOWS
AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, 3 WSWC Water
Management Symposium Proceedings, Sep. 11
(1986), a solid collection of articles on
public trust/public interest developments in
the 12 western states of the WSWC.

c.

Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473 (1970),
leading article on public trust doctrine.

d.

Schieber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law
in American Legal History, 72 Cal. L. Rev.
217 (1984), thorough essay on judicial
enforcement of public rights in water law
beginning in the early nineteenth century.

e.

Wilkinson, Western Water Law In Transition,
56 Colo. L. Rev. 317 (1985), survey of recent
trends in western water law.

3. Recent general-audience books on Western Water:
a.

P. Fradkin, A RIVER NO MORE: THE COLORADO
RIVER AND THE WEST (1981).

b.

D. Worster, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY

—N

AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985).
c. M. Reisner, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN

WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986).

II. TOWARD A WORKING DEFINITION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. The Elusive Concept of the Public Interest
In the search for the public interest, no one simple answer
in any concrete situation ordinarily suffices. The changing
nature of private interest and public emphasis necessarily
dictates that the public interest is an ambiguous goal, always
sought but never ultimately found. To some, the principal use of
our rivers ought to be for development. To others, preservation
of our limited natural resources is one of the highest endeavors
of organized society and ought to be a major goal of water
policy. In recent years the legislatures have begun to reflect
these preferences for nonconsumptive uses; the amount of lands
and, to a smaller degree, rivers set aside for recreation,
preservation and non-economic purposes continues to grow. This
is not to say the preservationists have "won" or should win. The
Nation needs energy rota water-driven projects, it needs food from
irrigated agriculture, it needs water for municipal and
industrial uses. But our society also needs to think; perhaps
even "think like a river" and make the shift from nature domination to nature accomodation.

B. The Traditional Definition: Beneficial Use
Defining public rights as a beneficial use was the original
3

method of defining permissible water uses in western states.
Initially the range of beneficial uses was limited to domestic,
municipal, irrigation, livestock, industrial, power, and mining
uses. One classic case representing the traditional view is
Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th
Cir. 1913), where a federal appeals court refused to define
recreation as a beneficial use, denying the resort town of
Cascade, Colorado the right to keep a waterfall flowing to retain
its scenic beauty.
C. Early Legislative Recognition of a Broader Set of
Interests
Oregon became the first western state to recognize
recreational and scenic values in 1915 when it set aside several
waterfalls from appropriation. See O.R.S. 538.200. In 1928
California constitutionalized modern notions of public interest
through the concept of reasonable use: "[Title general welfare
requiures . . . that the waste or unreasonable use . . . of water
be prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be
exercised . . . in the interest of the people and the public
welfare. N Cal. Const. art. X, § 2. Most western state
constitutions recognize public rights in water (impliedly
recognizing that extractive water development is in the public
interest), either stating that water is the property of the
public, (N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 2; Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5;
Wyo. Const. art. VIII, g 1), or declaring the appropriation of
water to be a public use. (Cal. Const. art. 10, g 5; Idaho
4

Const. art. 15, § 1; Wash. Const. art. XXI, § 1). However, only
the Alaska and California constitutions make strong, express
provisions for the protection of fish and wildlife. Alaska
Const. art. VIII, § 3, 13-14; Cal. Const. art 10A (added by
initiative, 1980).
D. Current Recognition of Public Rights
States continue to move gradually toward greater recognition
of public water rights, although in most cases they are junior to
established uses. Several western states expressly include
public rights in their statutory definition of beneficial use.
In Colorado, beneficial use includes the appropriation of minimum
flows "as required to preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree." Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-92-103(4), upheld in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water
Conservation Board, 197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570 (1979). See
also, Rev. Code Mont. 1983 § 85-2-102(2) (beneficial use means
use of water for the public, including fish, wildlife and
recreational uses); Wash. Ann. 90.54.020(1) (beneficial use
includes "fish and wildlife maintenance and enhancement,
recreation,. . . preservation of environmental and aesthetic
values"). Most states also have provisions that the "public
interest" must be considered int he granting of new permits and
in transfer applications. See Section IX A, infra. For a
discussion of how present definitions of beneficial use and
restrictions on transfers eliminate incentives to convert water
to new uses, see Tader, Reallocating Western Water: Beneficial
es"

Use. Property and Politics, 1986 Ill. L. Rev. 277 (1986).
Some western courts have expanded the limited view of
beneficial use as expressed in Empire. For example, the Idaho
supreme court held that recreational and aesthetic values
represent "an emerging recognition in this and other states of
social values and benefits from water." State of Idaho.
Department of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water Administration,
96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). A few have adopted the public
trust doctrine. See Section VIII, infra. See generally Sax,
Legal Control of Water Resources 1-152 (1986).

E. Expanding and Specifying the Public Interest:
Efficiency and Environmental Concerns
There is increasing debate over the ways in which the
promotion of efficiency and the protection of environmental
values should be implemented in water allocation systems. Many
writers have argued that public interest objectives should be
spelled out with greater clarity in order to effectively achieve
those objectives. See Sutler, Defining

a Water Ethic Through

Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework For Analysis, 1986
Ill. L. Rev. 439. According to Butler, the general objectives in
a public interest statute should at least include: 1) reduction
of waste, 2) political accountability of decisionmaking, and 3)
weighing of nonefficiency concerns (values that are appropriately
weighed into the public interest but which do not tend to make
the decision more cost effective). One such attempt is the
Alaska Water Use Act, which explicitly enumerates the elements
6

that constitute the public interest. See Alaska Stat. 46.15.080(a)-(b). These elements include the effect of appropriation on
fish and wildlife, recreational opportunities, public health and
access to public waters.
Putting a value on environmental gains and losses can be
difficult, but failing accurately to value the complete water
resource can result in pollution, inadequate protection of
instream values, and inefficient use of water resources. See,
e.g., Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights. Economic
Forces and Public Regulation, 5 Nat. Res. J. 1, 18-23 (1965);
Milliman, Can People Be Trusted With Natural Resources ?, 38 Land
Econ. 199 (1962). Some feel that the key to improving the
efficiency and equity of water use in agricultural production is
through more realistic pricing of water resources. See Pierce &
Furuseth, Constraints to Expanded Food Production: A North
American Perspective, 26 Nat. Res. 15, 37 (1986). There is also
growing pressure to increase the transferability of water rights
in an attempt to foster economically efficient and socially
beneficial uses of water. See e.g., Freyfogle, Water Justice,
1986 Ill. L. Rev. 481; T. Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the
Policy Drought (1983); Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A
Blueprint for Change, 61 Or. L. Rev. 483 (1982).

III. THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC VALUES OF WATER IN ANCIENT SOCIETIES
A. The Growth of Agricultural Civilizations in the
American West
7

Neolithic subsistence agriculture in the American west dates
to approximately 3000 BC. R. Dasmann, Environmental Conservation
58-85 (1978). When neolithic farmers began to settle in the
river basins, new agicultural tools and new techniques of
irrigation farming produced greater yields. This in turn removed
the threat of starvation and created time for leisure and other
tasks, resulting in the development and growth of civilizations.

N.
In the Southwest, American Indian civilizations, such as the
Paiute in the prehistoric Owens Valley of California and the
Papago or "Bean People" of the Sonoran desert, developed
"irrigation cultures" without sacrificing their reverence for
water as a sacred element in their religions. See, e.g., D.
Worster, Rivers of Empire 32 (1985); C. Bowden, Killing the
Hidden Waters (1977). The shallow irrigation ditches dug by the
Hohokams with stone hoes between 1100 and 1300 AD survive to this
day. Later Hispanic societies were premised on the community
value of water. See generally M. Meyer, Water in the Hispanic
Southwest 12-19 (1984).
B. Earlier Developments in the Old World
The desert was also the scene of early agricultural development in the old world, most notably China, India, and the Middle
East in the Tigris, Euphrates and Nile river systems. Extensive
canals and storage systems for irrigation were used in Egypt
along the Nile at the time of Rameses II in the thirteenth
century B.C. See M. Baker, The Quest for Pure Water: The History
8

of Water Purification from the Earliest Records to the Twentieth
Century (1949). Yet where the Hohokam's land suffered from salt
accumilation, the Egyptians employed a "symbiotic" water-to-land
ratio to flush the salts away. Agriculture was limited to one
third of the year and no substantial extensions of the cultivated
areas were permitted. Worster, supra at 43.
The most elaborate water resource management and regulation
in ancient society took place in the Yellow River Basin of China.
Attempts to control "China's Sorrow"--the Yellow River--led to
the construction of levees, the earliest public water works.
Levees soon became implements of war between low lying fuedal
states, and a treaty banning such misuse of public levees was
signed in 651 B.C. C. Greer, Water Management in the Yellow
River Basin of China 25 (1979).
River management agencies in the Han Dynasty (B.C. 206 - 220
A.D.) were roughly comparable to administrative agencies in the
contemporary west. To battle sedimentation, for flood control
and the development of irrigation works, renovation and expansion
of public water projects took place on a massive scale. Consolidation of power in a central government for the whole empire
lead to a Ministry of Public Works. The Ministry controlled
basin by basin water management and planning, while construction
of projects was the responsibility of local agencies. A "Director of Water Conservancy" was to manage water for the public
good. Id. at 31.
For other sources on water use in ancient socities, see K.
9

Butzer, Early Hydraulic Civilization in Egypt (1976); J. Needham,
Science and Civilization in China (1971); J. Bennett,
Anthropological Contributions to Cultural Ecology and Management
of Water Resources (in Man and Water 43 (L. James ed 1974)).

IV. ROOTS OF AMERICAN LAW
A. Ancient Roman Rights In Rivers and Seashores
"Natural law" or lex naturae was borrowed from the Greeks by
the Romans and stood for virtue or moral excellence; a universal
order so great that the Roman institution of slavery was considered "contrary to natural right." H. Althaus, Public Trust
Rights 1-70 (U.S. Dept. of Interior, Nov. 3 1978)(quoting T.
Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian (4th ed. 1867)). The Roman
law of public rights in running waters from the Institutes was
part of the "laws of nature," distinct from laws that could be
amended by consent of the people or by new legislation. Id. "By
the law of nature these things are common to mankind--the air,
running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea."
Institutes 2.1.1. "All rivers and ports are public; hence the
right of fishing in a port, or in rivers, is common to all men."
Id. at 2.1.2.
.V\
The Institutes were one of four prl cipal parts of the Corpus
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Juris Civilis, and functioned as a treatise with the force of law
and constitution. See MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the
Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance.
and Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
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511 (1975). The Romans made a distinction between public and
private rivers. Brooks and torrential rivers were subject to
private ownership; apparently most others were not. Id. at 520
(quoting from the Digest, another component of Corpus Juris
Civilis). The bed of a public river, or res publicae, was owned
by the state. The bed of a private river belonged to private
riparian proprietors, and the banks of all rivers could be owned
by riparians. In a public river, the public had the right to use
the water. MacGrady, supra, at 527-28; Althaus, supra, at 5.
There are several clear parallels between Roman and modern
American trust principles. The state, as inherent owner of the
beds of harbors, held ownership subject to perpetual use
dedicated to the public. In regard to rivers and their banks,
ownership rights of private proprietors were suspended, subject
to the use of the public (unless the water "deserted its
channel"). Althaus, supra at 5. The transfer to private
ownership could only take place without substantial impairment to
the public interest. See also Stevens, The Public Trust: A Soveriegn's Ancient Perogative Becomes the People's Environmental
Right, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 195 (1980).

B. English Common Law:
During the early centuries of the "Dark Ages," public rights
in waters declined in both the British Isles and on the European
continent, while private, exclusive rights to fish were
frequently claimed and used by members of the aristocracy. Note,
11

The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 Yale L. J. 762, 764 (1970).
Between the Norman Conquest in 1066 and the the first Magna
Charta in 1215, the nobility exploited fishery resources by
attaching weirs to the beds of streams flowing over their land.
The first Magna Charta--the "Great Charter of King John"--expressly prohibited weirs in rivers "throughout the country."
Althaus, infra at 24 (quoting R. Thompson, An Historical Essay on
the Magna Charta of King John (1829)).
Two doctrines of primary importance to public rights in
water have evolved from English common law. One is that
navigable waters in England were coextensive with tidewaters.
See part VI, infra. The second is the public trust doctrine-that the shores and submerged beds of navigable waters were held
in trust by the English Crown for the benefit of all people. The
public trust rights of English common law which were later incorporated into early American law are found in Sir Matthew Hale's
De Jure Mans and De Portibus Mans, both written in 1670 (cited

in Selvin,

The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic

Policy. 1789-1920, 1980 Wisc. L. Rev. 1403-04, n.4.)
Rights known as ius publicum, or public rights, attached to
ports, navigable waters, and tidal and properties. Such rights
included unobstructed navigation, fishing, loading and unloading
at ports or on the banks of navigable rivers, towing along
navigable rivers, and the right of access to the sea over private
property. The rights were vested in the public and could not be
12

restrained or diminished, even by the Crown. The Crown was
permitted to grant tideland properties to private parties, but
the public retained its rights of use and access. Selvin, supra,
at 1403. See also 2 H. Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of
England 39-40 (S. Thorne trans. 1968) (Crown considered to own
public areas but public enjoyed right to use them; thus Crown's
ownership could not be transferred or separated from the soveriegn).
Police power in English common law encompassed the
legitimate authority of government to act for the common good.
The "public police"--Blackstone's "due regulation and domestic
order of the kingdom,"--was the foundation for a judicial
doctrine of public rights. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 163;
Schieber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal
History, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 217 (1984). The United States Supreme
Court interpreted the English common law to uphold public rights,
both in the public trust area and in the protection of the public
interest. See e.g., Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto.)
113 (1877); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892).
C. The Legacy of Roman and English Law
Justinian's and Bracton's writings have recently been
criticized as their own idealizations that did not reflect Roman
and English practice. See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Soveriegnty in Natural Resources: Questioning the
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 643-44 n.75 (1986).
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However, our modern notions of public trust rights in waters
trace their roots to these sources, and the effect of English and
Roman laws upon the development of public rights in water law has
been extensively documented. See e.g., Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473 (1970); Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California Water
Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 357 (1980); Fahmy, The Public Trust
Doctrine as a Source of State Reserved Water Rights, 63 Den. U.
L. Rev. 585, 588 (1986).

V. PUBLIC RIGHTS IN EARLY AMERICAN WATER LAW
A. The Westward Expansion: Early References to Public
Rights in the Northwest Ordinance
The use of waterways played an important part in the
exploration and settlement of the west. The Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, providing that the "navigable water leading into the
Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the
same, shall be common highways and forever free," became a source
of public rights to hunters over 125 years after its passage in
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wisc. 261, 145 N.W. 816
(1914). Additionally, the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance
have been incorporated in territorial acts, e.g., the Oregon
Territorial Act, 9 Stat. 323, 329 (1848), and in statehood
admission acts, 11 Stat. 383 (1859) (Oregon admission act providing that "all the navigable waters . . . shall be common highways
14

and forever free"). The impact of the Northwest Ordinance on the
public interest in navigable streams was reaffirmed in Economy

Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921)
(upholding the navigability of the Des Plaines River as an early
fur trade route and enjoining the construction of a dam without
the consent of Congress. For more on the Northwest Ordinance as
a source of public rights, see Waite, Public Rights to Use and
Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. Rev. 335.
B.

Public Rights From International Treaties

As westward expansion continued, treaties with foreign
nations were made that guaranteed public rights through foreign
land grants. The Treaty of 1803 for the Louisiana Territory and
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (through which the United
States acquired California and most of the Southwest) both
stipulated that the United States recognized the validity of land
grants made under previous rulers of these territories. Thus,
United States courts have upheld Spanish, Mexican and French
dedications of property to public purposes. See, e.g., State v.
Grubstake Investment Ass'n, 297 S.W. 202 (Tex. 1927); MacGrady,
supra, at 534-45.
Hispanic rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo also served as an independent basis for guaranteeing
public rights to navigable waters. See Bowden, Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants in the Southwest, 8 Land & Water L. Rev. 467
(1973). A thirteenth century Spanish law, Las Siete Partidas,
was recently applied to protect public rights that had applied to
15

California while it was a part of Mexico and thereafter under the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Las Siete Partidas states that the
sea, seashores, rivers, harbors, and public highways "belong to
all persons in common." City of Los Angeles v. Venice Penninsula
properties, 31 Cal 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792 (1982). But see Summa
Corp. v. California ex rel. State Land Commission, 466 U.S. 198
(1984) (holding that the State of California could not assert its
public trust easement as to tidelands because private title
confirmed under 1851 Act to settle Mexican land claims). See
Cheever, A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants and
the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property Interest Protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1364
(1986).

VI. THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Naviga

.-.Origin and Early Developments

The underlying rationale of the navigability concept traces
its legal origins to Roman and English law. Under Roman law,
navigable rivers were a class of watercourse that received a
higher degree of regulation and protection. MacGrady, supra, at
529. The English Crown held title to the beds and waters in all
navigable rivers, subject to the ius vublicum. In the United
States, ownership of rivers passed to the original states as the
Crown's successors. When the states agreed to the Commerce
Clause in the Constitution, however, the Clause was understood to
allow for national regulation of waterways. See generally Bartke,
16

Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation -- Struggle for a
Doctrine, 48 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1968).
B.

The Test for Title Navigability

The English Common Law test of navigability was whether the
water in question was effected by the ebb and flow of the tide;
all inland waters above the influence of the tide were
nonnavigable. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
428 (1825). The American test is broader. The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), redefined navigable waters as any
waters that are navigable in fact. The current federal title
test involves three main parts. First, navigability for title is
determined as of the date of statehood. Second, the waterbody
must be susceptible to navigation for commerce in its natural and
re"

ordinary condition at state-hood. Third, commercial navigation
can be any "customary mode" of trade or travel, and does not
require interstate commerce. See United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); United States v. Utah, 403 U.S. 9
(1971).
C.

The Navicia
The

e

The concept of title navigability also defines the basic
reach of the navigation servitude--the rule of no compensation
that allows the federal government to affect adversely private
property without payment under the Fifth Amendment. The
servitude extends to projects that affect watercourses navigable
for title and, if Congress expressly so provides, to nonnavigable tributaries where there is a reseasonable relationship
17

to navigability. See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316
(1917); United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229
(1960). See generally Getches, supra, at 338-51.
D. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine was created to protect the
public's right to navigation in navigable waters (those
watercourses navigable for title). The debate began when midnineteenth century state legislatures granted exclusive
priveleges in and transferred title to submerged and waterfront
lands in major metropolitan areas. State courts generally upheld
the trusteeship power of the state legislature to improve public
waterways for public use without requiring just compensation for
damages to riparian owners. Selvin, supra at 1434.
In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892), the Illinois legislature attempted to convey a portion of
Chicago's harbor on Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad. The legislature subsequently invalidated the conveyance,
and the Supreme Court upheld the state's action on the basis of
the public trust doctrine. Illinois could make grants of public
trust lands only for specific purposes and only if the grants did
not "substantially impair the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining." Id. at 453.
Illinois Central articulated the traditional definition of
the public trust doctrine; that the state holds title to lands
under navigable and tide waters, and the title is held in trust
for the people of the state to enjoy for commerce, fishing and
18
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navigation. The Illinois Central Court also declared the trust
to be inalienable, and that the "state could no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested,
. . than it can abdicate its police powers in the
admninistration of government and the preservation of the peace."
Id.
Initially invoked to prevent the alienation of navigable water
courses, the public trust doctrine has collided with the prior
appropriation system during the past decade. See United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W. 2d 457 (N.D. 1976). The larger potential of the public
trust doctrine in water law was realized in National Audobon
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189
Cal Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 413
(1983). In National Audobon, the California Supreme Court held
that diversions of nonnavigable tributaries feeding Mono Lake are
subject to the public trust doctrine. This conclusion was
reached in spite of the state agency's 1940 permit to the City of
Los Angeles to use water from the non-navigable streams feeding
the lake. In an important qualification, the court rejected the
notion that the public trust doctrine limits all appropriative
water rights as a matter of "current and historical necessity."
Id. at 446. Nevertheless, before the state can approve a
diversion, it must "attempt, so far as is feasible, to avoid or
minimize any harm to those interests." Id. at 426.
For other recent decisions, see United States v. State Water
19

Resources Control Board, 227 Cal.Rptr. 161 (Cal App. 1 Dist.
1986); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. State Board of
Lands Commr's, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983); Shokal V.
Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985); Montana Coalition for Stream
Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). For alternative
views on the public trust doctrine, see generally Dunning, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?,
30 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 17 (1985); Ausness, Water Rights. The
Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986
Ill. L. Rev. 407; Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Soveriegntv in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631 (1986).

VII. NAVIGABILITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
A. The Distinction Between Navigability and Congressional
Power under the Commerce Clause
In the early cases, the classification of waters as
navigable was used as a measure of the federal government's
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) interpreted the
commerce clause as "comprehending navigation within the limits
of every state." Under the federal commerce power, navigable
waters became "the public property of the nation, and subject to
all direct legislation by Congress." Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
20

The cases subsequent to Gilman upheld federal authority over
water-courses not navigable for title--but the Court continued to
use the rubric of "navigability." For example, the doctrine
expanded into non-navigable parts of navigable rivers, United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899);
to streams formerly navigable but no longer used for commerce,
Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113
(1921); to streams that could reasonably be improved to a
condition, United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
navigable condition,
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); and finally to non-navigable
tributaries to navigable streams where the navigable capacity of
the latter is affected and where Congress has expressly exercised
its power over the tributary. United States v. Grand River Dam
Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960). See also Leighty, The Source and
Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 Land &
Water L. Rev. 391 (1970).
The Court has now clarified that there is no correlation
between the classic navigability concept and the reach of federal
power. As Justice Rehnquist stated in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), "reference to the navigability of a
waterway adds little if anything to the breadth of Congress'
regulatory power over interstate commerce:"
It has long been settled that Congress has
extensive authority over this nation's water
under the Commerce Clause. Early in our
history this court held that the power to
regulate commerce necessarily includes power
over navigation. . . . [But], a wide spectrum
of economic activities "affect" interstate
commerce and thus are susceptible of congres21

sional regulation under the Commerce Clause
irrespective of whether navigation, or,
indeed, water, is involved. The cases that
discuss Congress' paramount authority to
regulate waters used in interstate commerce
are consequently best understood when viewed
in terms of a more traditional Commerce Clause
analysis than by reference to whether the
stream in fact is capable of supporting
navigation or may be characterized as "navigable water of the United States."
The modern scope of federal power over water is nearly unlimited.
For purposes of obtaining a permit to discharge dredge and fill
material into navigable waters under § 404 of the Clean Water Act,
(33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1362 and 1444), the Corps of Engineers has
defined navigable waters to include "freshwater wetlands."
Freshwater wetlands are in turn defined by the Corps as "areas
that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support . . . a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and
similar areas." In United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes.
Inc., 106 S.Ct. 455 (1985), a private landowner sought to fill 80
acres of low-lying marshy land. The lower court held that
frequent flooding by adjacent navigable water was essential to
regulation by the Corps. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld
ederal authority, acknowleging the hydrological connection
tween wetlands and other bodies of water for the purposes of
mbatting water pollution under the Clean Water Act.
AND'Y

B. The Tenth Amendment: Expansive State Authority in the

, Absence of Federal Preemption
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The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. VI, cl.
2, requires states to comply with federal law when 1) a federal
power has been validly exercised by Congress and 2) Congress
intended to preempt state law. Thus, for example, the federal
government can establish instream flows on the federal lands, even
if a state does not recognize instream flows as a beneficial use.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
However, Congress has traditionally deferred to state water
law and the states are therefo;re able to exercise broad authority
over water. Older cases suggesting that state power over water is
based on waters within their borders (see. e.g., State v. Hiber,
48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005 (1935)), are now best understood as
recognizing expansive state jurisdiction under the Tenth Amendment
unless preempted by Congress. See, e.g., United States v. New
Mexico, supra; Hues v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (state
authority over wildlife based on police power, not ownership). In
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), the Court held
that section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383
requires federal compliance with state water laws, including
conditions imposed by state water agencies in federal permits.

VIII.

MODERN PUBLIC RIGHTS: THE STATE PROVISIONS
A. The sPublic Interest s Provisions
1. Appropriations
The laws of most states authorize the regulatory agency to

reject applications not in the public interest. For example, N.M.
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Stat. Ann. § 72-5-7 (1978) allows applications to be rejected if
the approval would be "contrary to the public interest." Courts
grant broad administrative authority to impose public interest
constraints on water use. Early cases construed the provisons
narrowly. See Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P.
1045 (1910); East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Department of
Public Works, 1 Ca1.2d 476 35 P.2d 1027 (1934); and Tanner v.
Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
A major interpretation of a public interest provision was
issued in Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985). The Idaho
Supreme Court remanded a decision to grant an appropriation permit
for a fish hatchery that would have lowered the flow in a 700 ft.
stretch of Billings Creek from 125 cfs to 25 cfs. The Shokal
court construed a vague public interest provision allowing the
Water Resources Director to reject an application if an
applicant's appropriation of water "will conflict with the local
public interest, where the local public interest is defined as the
affairs of the people in the area directly affected by the
proposed use." I.C. § 42-203A(5)(e). The court interpreted the
public interest to include: 1) fish and wildlife habitat, 2)
protection of aquatic life, 3) recreation, 4) aesthetic beauty, 5)
navigation; 6) water quality; 7) access to public waters; 8)
minimum stream flows; 9) waste prevention; and 10) the promotion
of conservation. The Shokal court also found that the statute was
an affirmative duty to assess and protect the public interest,
this duty being "related to the larger doctrine of the public
24

trust."

The burden of proof is on the applicant to show

that the project is in the public interest or has factors that
outweigh it.
A major opinion from the First District Court of Appeals
upheld the authority of the state water board to regulate beneficial uses to protect water quality in the San Francisco Bay and
Delta. United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182
Cal. App. 3d 82, 277 Cal Rptr. 161 (1986). The court first stated
that protecting the public interest is a primary duty of the
Board. The court then determined that the public interest
includes the protection of water quality, relying on the Water
Quality Act, Cal. Water Code §§ 13000 et. seq. (West 1984), the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et. seq., and the California
"rule of reasonable use" derived from the state constitution.
Other significant opinions construing public interest
provisions include: United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171,
1177 (9th Cir. 1982) ["New Melones II"] (upholding the state
Board's authority to restrict rights of contractors holding
permits under federal reclamation law in order to protect water
quality); Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d
109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973) (public welfare includes the pollution
and health effects of an appropriation of lake water); People v.
Shirokow, 28 Cal. 3d 301, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859 (1980)
(Board can require salvage through the eradication of phreatophytes); Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assoc. v.
State Water Resources Control Board, 42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal.
25

Rptr. 770 (1974) (Board can impose a right of public access to
reservoirs). See generally Robie, The Public Interest in Water
Rights Administration, 23 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 917 (1977);
Clyde, Legal and Institutional Barriers to Transfers and Reallocation of Water Resources, 29 S. Dak. L. Rev. 232, 243-44 (1984).
2. Transfers
Most permit states authorize denial of a change of use on
public interest grounds. Several states apply the same public
interest criteria to transfers that are used for evaluating new
permit applications. See e. g „ Mont. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-402; N.D.
Cent. Code § 61-04-15.1(2); Idaho Code § 42-222(1). Alaska
administrative rules rerquire that a proposed change "will not
adversely affect the water rights of other persons or the public
interest.' 11 Alaska Admin. Code § 93-930(C). Future developments under such public interest provisions may be presaged by an
unreported trial court decision in New Mexico. In In the Matter
of Howard Sleeper, et al, Rio Arriba County Cause No. RA 84-53 (C)
(April 16, 1985), the court set aside an order of the State
Engineer granting an application to change the point of diversion
and the purpose and place of use of surface rights. The existing
use was for irrigation and the purpose of the changes was to
provide water for a planned ski resort and guest ranch. The court
said:
Northern New Mexicans possess a fierce pride
over their history, traditions and culture.
This region of Northern New Mexico and its
living culture are recognized at the state and
federal levels as possessing significant
cultural value, not measurable in dollars and
26

cents. The deep-felt and tradition-bound ties
of Northern New Mexico families to the land
and water are central to the maintenance of
that culture.
While these questions seem, at first, far
removed from the simple question of the
transfer of a few acre feet of water, the
destruction of the local culture by development which begins with small, seemingly
insignificant steps.
I am persuaded that to transfer water rights,
devoted for more than a century to agricultural purposes in order to construct a
playground for those who can pay is a poor
trade, indeed. I find that the proposed
transfer of water rights is clearly contrary
to the public interest and, on that separate
basis, the application should be denied.

B.

Interbasin Transfers

The decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)
made it clear that the demands of interstate commerce can override
the desire of any single state to ban exports of water. However,
states retain broad authority to condition the intra- and
interstate movement of water through the application process. See
generally MacDonnell & Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in
Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative
Approaches, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 526 (1986).
C.

State Instream Flow Programs

Minimum flow provisions allow state water boards to appropriate water to maintain a sufficient quantity within the stream
for recreation, fish and wildlife, and aesthetic purposes. Most
instream flow appropriations are relatively junior. Nevertheless,
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such instream flow rights may restrict the abillity of a senior
consumptive user to transfer the use to a point upstream of the
instream flow right, on the ground that the upstream transfer
would infringe on the right of a junior appropriator to have
maintained the stream conditions at the time of the junior's
appropriation. See, e.g., Farmer's Highline Canal and Reservoir
Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954). On
instream flows, see generally Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream
Flow Rights; New 'Public' Western Water Rights, 25 Rocky Mtn. Min.
L. Inst. 24 (1979).
D. State Wild and Scenic River Legislation
Some states, in addition to minimum instream flow programs,
also have wild and scenic river designation laws. For example,
the California Free Flowing Rivers Statute declares it is the
policy of the state that "certain rivers which possess extraordinary scenic, recreational, fishery or wildlife values shall be
preserved in their free flowing state." "Free flowing" means
existing or flowing without artificial impoundment, diversion or
other modification. West Ann. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 5093.50 to
5093.69. (1984). South Dakota law authorizes designation of
"wild, scenic and recreational river areas," S.D. Compiled Laws
Ann. § 46A-1-16, while Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. g 390.805-.925
(1985)), North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 61-29-01 to 06 (1985)),
and New Mexico (El Rio Chama Scenic and Pastoral Act, 1977 N.M.
Laws ch. 42), authorize the protection of specific rivers.

28

IX. MODERN PUBLIC RIGHTS: THE FEDERAL PROVISIONS
A.

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act

A change in the point of diversion often requires the deposit
of dredge and fill materials in navigable waters and/or the
construction of an impoundment. Because section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, provides the Army Corps of Engineers
with authority to regulate such activities, any application to
change the point of diversion will have to accomodate the requirements of this section.
In Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508
(10th Cir. 1985), the Corps denied Riverside District a nationwide
permit under section 404 because the proposed reservoir would
adversely impact critical habitat of the whooping crane, an
endangered species. The 10th Circuit upheld the Corps' decision
to require the district to proceed by an individual permit rather
than a nationwide permit. The court reached this conclusion in
spite of the Clean Water Act's policy of deferring to state water
law, Section 101(g), 33 U.S.C.

1251(g) (1982). The Riverside

Irrigation court also read the Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act broadly: "[T]he statute focuses not merely on water
quality, but rather on all of the effects on the 'aquatic
environment' caused by replacing water with fill material . . . ."
Id. at 512.
B.

The Endangered Species Act

In addition to confirming the Corps' authority to condition
permits under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the 10th Circuit
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in Riverside Irrigation addressed the issue of how the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et. seq. affects state created water
rights. The court recognized the Corps' mandatory obligation
under Section 7 of the ESA to "insure . . . the continued existence" of the whooping crane, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, and its duty to
protect the crane from "downstream effects of changes in water
quality." Id. at 512. The 10th Circuit also placed the burden of
proof on Riverside District to demonstrate that the discharge of
dredge material would not "destroy or adversely impact the
critical habitat" of the whooping crane.
Another decision has held that the ESA requires "the Secretary [to] actively pursue a species conservation policy" and to
give priority to the protection of the endangered cui-cui and the
threatened Lahontan cutthroat trout in his operation of a reservoir feeding Pyramid Lake. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy
District v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984). The court
upheld the Secretary's decision to devote all of the storage in
Stampede Reservoir to provide instream flows in order to protect
the covered species. See generally Tarlock, The Endangered
Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 Land and Water L. Rev. 3
(1985).
C. Pacific Salmon
Pressure to protect Columbia River Salmon and Steelhead has
led to federal legislation to protect flows in the Columbia River.
The Northwest Power Planning Council was established by the Northwest Power Act of 1980 to set energy and fisheries policy in the
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Columbia River Basin. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982). Each of the
four states in the basin appoints two members to the Commission,
which is directed to protect Indian fishing and water rights,
instream flows, and wild fish runs. See Wilkinson, & Conner, The
Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of
a Common Property Resource, 32 Kan. L. Rev. 17, 25 (1983). The
model of the Northwest Power Act combines federal multipurpose
water legislation and state representation in a regional body,
giving proper recognition to both national needs and state
perogatives.

D. Obligations To Governments Other Than the State of
Transfer
1. Federal Reserved Water Rights
The reserved rights doctrine provides that when the United
States withdraws land from disposition, and reserves it for a
particular purpose, -- for example, the creation of a national
park, forest, wilderness, etc. -- the government may impliedly
reserve unappropriated water to the extent necessary to accomplish
the primary purposes of the reservation. These rights sometimes
set aside water for minimum instream flows and for ecosystem
maintenance. In effect, the reserved rights doctrine superimposes
federal water rights on top of an already existing state prior
appropriation system. These rights, which are quite strictly
construed by the courts, vest in the government as of the date of
the reservation and are senior to the rights of future private
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appropriations. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978) (national forests); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128
(1976) (national monument); Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842
(D. Colo. 1985) (wilderness area). For a discussion of the
unsettled status of reserved rights on federal wild and scenic
rivers, see generally Andrews & Buchsbaum, Federalism and the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 59 Wash. L.
Rev. 417 (1984); Federal Water Rights of the National Park
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation, and the
Bureau of Land Management, 88 Interior Decisions 553 (1979)
2. Indian Reserved Water Rights
Western water law must also account for water rights of
Indian tribes. The Winters doctrine, closely related to the
federal reserved water rights doctrine, provides that when the
tribes ceded their aboriginal land to the federal government, they
reserved sufficient water to meet their future as well as present
needs. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Most Indian water rights will
be quantified in state, rather than federal, courts. See Arizona
v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). On Indian water
rights, see generally F. Cohen, Handbook on Federal Indian Law,
ch. 10 (1982 ed.).
The Western States Water Council recently reported that
Indian water rights in the western states may approach forty five
million acre-feet per year. See Western Governor's Association,
Indian Water Rights in the West (1984). This is a rough estimate,
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but it demonstrates the central role that Indian water rights play
in marketing decisions in numerous drainages across the west.
3. Obligations to Downstream States
In Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, the states of Iowa, Nebraska and Missouri sought to
enjoin a proposed water transfer from the Oahe reservoir in South
Dakota to Wyoming for a coal slurry operation for Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI). The states alleged that the
proposed depletion of water would impair their rights to obtain
sufficient quatities of water to meet beneficial uses and would
injure fish and wildlife habitats. The court did not reach the
hard question of exactly what obligation an upstream state owes to
a downstream state. The court did, however, hold that state's
allegations of injury to fish and wildlife habitats and to
beneficial uses did meet the injury in fact component of standing
and that the injury was "fairly traceable" to the Corps' granting
of the permit. Id. at 277. The court also held that the
downstream states had standing to bring this action even though
South Dakota had already granted ETSI a state permit. "The fact
that South Dakota granted ETSI the natural flow rights does not
deny the states standing to challenge the contract allowing ETSI
to withdraw water from the federal reservoir." Id. at 277 fn. 5.
The ETSI pipeline case suggests that there may be circumstances in which water transfer proposals must take into account the
needs of downstream states on interstate streams. These obligations have not been firmed up in the case law, and probably are
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relevant only to very substantial projects, such as the ETSI pipeline, but the rights of other states are yet another factor to
include in the formula.

X. MODERN PUBLIC RIGHTS: RESTRICTIONS ON LAND MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES
A.

Public Lands

Several statutes require federal land management agencies to
protect water resources. In addition to section 404 of the clean
Water Act discussed earlier, section 402 (33 U.S.0 § 1342)
regulates point source pollutants, and section 208 (33 U.S.C. §
1288) regulates nonpoint sources. See generally W. Rodgers,
Environmental Law 354-61 (1977), 187-205 (1984 Supp.). The
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et. seq.,
requires federal agencies to assess the impacts of projects on
water resources. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (1985). The Forest Service
has additional obligations under the National Forest Management
Act to protect riparian areas. 16 U.S.C. §§1604(a)(3)(E);
1604(a)(3)(F). See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and
9
Reource
Planning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1, 217A
255 (1985), and the authorities cited there.

B.

Private Lands

State regulation of forestry practices provides a mechanism
to protect water resources on private forest lands. For example,
the Oregon Forest Practices Act declares that it is public policy
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to maintain water resources, habitat for wildlife and aquatic
life, and to "protect soil, air and water resources, including but
not limited to streams, lakes and estuaries. . .

Or. Rev.

Stat. 527.630(1)-(3). In several states, these statutes have been
adminiad in an increasingly rigorous manner during recent
A
years. See generally Cubbage & Ellefson, State Forest Practice
Laws: A Maior Policy Force Unique to the Natural Resources
Community, 13 Nat. Res. Law. 432 (1984).

XI. CONCLUSION: A DEVELOPING MOVEMENT TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE
WATERSHED PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
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